Implementing the Clean Energy Package for Demand Response

4<sup>th</sup> Workshop: POSSIBLE
COMPENSATION PAID TO
THIRD PARTIES
(SUPPLIERS/BRPs)

Monday 28<sup>th</sup> June 2021 16.30-17.30 CET





#### AGENDA OF THE 4<sup>th</sup> WORKSHOP ON MONDAY 28<sup>th</sup> JUNE: COMPENSATION TO SUPPLIERS (1)

16:30 Welcome & opening remarks

Tomás LLOBET, Secretary General, European Energy Retailer (EER)

**16:35** Compensation to other market participants

Mathilde LALLEMAND, DG ENER, European Commission

Implementing the Clean Energy Package: costs during DR activation and what may be paid to suppliers (/BRPs)

Pierre BIVAS, Chair, DR4EU

17:05 Q&A session moderated by Antonio COLINO, President, EER

CLOSING REMARKS & end of the workshop

17:30



# Demand side flexibility: compensation to suppliers

Mathilde Lallemand European Commission – DG Energy Internal Energy Market



#### Strict limits to compensation payments

#### **Article 17.4 - Demand response through aggregation**

Member States may require electricity undertakings or participating final customers to pay financial compensation to other market participants or to the market participants' balance responsible parties, if those market participants or balance responsible parties are directly affected by demand response activation.

Such financial compensation shall not create a barrier to market entry for market participants engaged in aggregation or a barrier to flexibility.



In such cases, the financial compensation shall be strictly limited to covering the resulting costs incurred by the suppliers of participating customers or the suppliers' balance responsible parties during the activation of demand response.

The method for calculating compensation may take account of the benefits brought about by the independent aggregators to other market participants and, where it does so, the aggregators or participating customers may be required to contribute to such compensation but only where and to the extent that the benefits to all suppliers, customers and their balance responsible parties do not exceed the direct costs incurred.

The calculation method shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority or by another competent national authority.





#### Implementing the Clean Energy Package for Demand Response

### Compensation paid to suppliers/BRPs


when DR is sold in the wholesale market

Workshop #4
28<sup>th</sup> June 2021



## Takeaways from previous sessions on balancing responsibilities when DR sold in the wholesale market

✓ Balancing resp. of DR aggregators in wholesale market as an alternative to generation, same responsibility: to deliver volumes sold



- ✓ Impacts on third parties, i.e. suppliers of DR participating consumers
  - Balancing resp. of suppliers: models where imbalances are settled or with perimeter correction
  - > Today: which costs, hence i.e. who should receive 'compensation' (if any)
  - Next time: Who should pay 'compensation' (and yet need to ensure not to create a barrier to DR)
  - Further workshop to focus on DR as BSP = on balancing markets






### Compensation: which costs?

- "pay financial compensation to other market participants or to the market participants' balance responsible parties, if those market participants or balance responsible parties are <u>directly</u> affected by demand response activation."
- "financial compensation shall be strictly <u>limited to covering the resulting costs</u> incurred by the suppliers of participating customers or the suppliers' balance responsible parties <u>during</u> the activation of demand response."
- "The method for calculating compensation may take account of the benefits brought about by the independent aggregators to other market participants"
- ✓ Consider suppliers of participating customers or the suppliers' BRPs
- ✓ During activation (not 'rebound')
- ✓ Identify costs ... those affected will depend on 'models'

## Economic impact of DR on suppliers Why is there a cost? (not to mention benefits)

Wholesale markets (in advance, e.g. day ahead )




Via wholesale markets (i.e. in advance) consumption forecast is balanced by purchases

- > Lower market price => reduced sourcing costs & volatility of prices
  - ➤ Benefits for all suppliers... and ultimately for all consumers:


    ✓ Cf study by CompassLexecon (6<sup>th</sup> May 2021)
  - > Further consequences to be discussed in future workshop

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
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
Actual consumption (90) (as reduced by DR) is balanced by actual electricity generation (90)

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


Actual consumption (90) (as reduced by DR) is balanced by actual electricity generation (90)

- > Suppliers buy 100, but sell only 90 to consumers: what about the 10?
  - ➤ Overall cost of buying DR: 10 @ market price
    - ✓ Market-based way to pay for DR ... automation
- > Also possible impact on imbalances (accounting imbalances, not physical)
  - ... depending on accounting rules: 'models'


### (1) Model "where imbalances are settled"

#### Accounting for imbalance of a supplier with curtailed consumers




- Imbalance settlement => supplier ('s BRP) paid for positive imbalance
  - Same as any unforeseen load behaviour, not specific to DR
  - Price depending on national rules, EBGL promotes single price ~spot ±∂
- No cost for supplier/BRP if price is appropriate
- No basis for any (other) 'compensation' to individual suppliers/BRPs: easy to implement
- Where does the cost hide?
  - Embedded in the settlement account within the TSO (/settlement entity)
  - Overall total "accounting imbalance of +10"
  - Depending on national rules, may be recouped by TSO from all BRPs on a *pro rata* basis (volumes, or imbalances, etc.)

#### System physical balance...




Actual consumption (90) (as reduced by DR) is balanced by actual electricity generation (90)

## System physical balance ... and balance on the supply side



Actual consumption (90) (as reduced by DR) is balanced by actual electricity generation (90)




✓ Perfect balance on the supply side

#### Physical balance


#### ...but accounting imbalance for retailers...

...and for TSO




- An accounting issue for the TSO, and a cost (not for suppliers, but for the settlement account)
- Some (TSOs) suggested to use a corrected model => suppliers request a compensation for correction

### (2) Model "with perimeter correction"



- No accounting imbalance left
- Perimeter correction deprives BRP of positive imbalance revenue
- Supplier buys 15 and bills 12
- > DR activation + correction => cost transferred to supplier of curtailed consumers
- Basis for a compensation to such supplier for the corrected volume (+3)
- Simplest implementation
  - Payment related to correction: by the settlement entity (TSO) -> next workshop
  - @spot price (day ahead) which is usually pivotal in all settlements, and also the overall cost
- > Should 'cost' for a given supplier be net of savings on his purchases, i.e. net cost? to avoid overcompensation

## (2) Model "with perimeter correction" A focus on price for compensation to supplier



#### Various counterfactuals

- With/without DR => retail revenue (but this includes margin, on top of costs + confidential + risk of gaming by suppliers)
  - ... and the EMD (art.17-4) refers to "costs", not foregone revenues
- + Dynamics over time: without correction, BRPs would adapt, buy less or resell excess=> spot price, or even intraday price
- With/without correction => positive imbalance price (but this depends on balancing prices, may not be appropriate)
- With/without DR sold in the market => spot price

#### Still: should "cost" for a given supplier be net of his savings on purchases, i.e. net costs only

- ➤ If not, means counterfactual is with DR but not sold in the market => spot price
- If yes, lower price to be used for compensation to suppliers
- This is individual net cost, to avoid individual overcompensation;
- ≠ net benefit principle, designed to avoid global overcompensation of suppliers

## Summary on models for BR and possible compensation to suppliers /BRPs

#### (1) Imbalances are settled

- Simple and straightforward
  - No change in BRP rules, nor IT systems
  - "Neutral": same for suppliers and their BRPs whether consumers reduce their load spontaneously or in order to sell DR in the market
- Payment to BRP for imbalances
  - Appropriate price paid to BRPs?
  - No need for any other compensation to suppliers/BRPs: it is embedded in the settlement process
  - Issue of compensation to TSO/settlement entity/ settlement account, thus shared among BRPs: to be discussed during next workshop
- > Simplest approach to start

#### (2) Perimeter correction

- Need to assess volume of DR per BRP
  - TSO/settlement entity need to know
  - Split DR volumes totalled per BRP (all aggregators, all customers)
  - Data
- BRP is deprived of positive imbalance and related payment
  - Compensation to BRPs for correction? => spot price
  - Compensation to suppliers for volumes bought (and not billed to consumers)?
    - 'costs', not foregone revenues => overall DR volume bought => spot price
    - Need to split DR volumes totalled per supplier (all aggregators, all customers)
    - Data
- May be viewed as long term solution

Member States to choose among these models ... yet comply with CEP

=> we'll have to assess them when discussing who should pay compensation and how, data, etc.





### Possible compensation to suppliers (/BRPs)

DR operating in the electricity wholesale market (e.g. day ahead)

Other topics coming later = not today

- 'Compensation': paid by whom and how
- DR in the balancing market
- Data needed
- •

